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A
s a graduate student, two months shy of defending
my dissertation proposal, I yanked a first, respect-
able rough draft off my advisers’ desks and replaced
it with something completely new: a pitch to head to
Uganda and start a study of child soldiering. My advisers
were unimpressed. “This sounds more like a policy report
than a dissertation,” said one, “I’m not sure you should
go.” No one disagreed the issue was important. But is
tackling a humanitarian issue the sensible start for a bud-
ding social scientist? It’s a question young earnest scholars
ask themselves every year: Can I get my Ph.D. and still
save the world?
As it happened, there was more to my pitch. Buried
inside the proposal, hidden to me at the time, was the
germ of actual social science, something more than a pol-
icy report. Ultimately, the study would change the way I
think about fundamental questions in international rela-
tions and comparative politics: the organization of rebel-
lion, the diffusion of international norms, and the legacy
of political violence on economic and political develop-
ment. Big questions, I discovered, get answered in unusual
places.
For the academic who tackles policy questions or human-
itarian issues, the real world impact can be its own reward.
If that means sacrificing “serious” scholarship, some say,
then so be it. I think that trade-off, however, is false and
misleading. It leads to narrow and disjointed scholarship.
Policy and science both suffer when the links to theory
and big questions are ignored.
The three books under review here all tackle a topic—
children in war—with glaring moral consequence. Each
book manages to avoid most of the myths and clichés that
surround their lurid subjects. And each book delivers orig-
inal and overlooked lessons for the problems facing war-
affected children. But perhaps most important, each book
contains lessons for our larger understanding of warfare
and the politics of advocacy and aid.
These larger lessons, however, can struggle to emerge,
for issues of great moral consequence can also obscure.
Child soldiers and children born of wartime rape are as
vivid, wrenching, and sensational as any subject in our
profession. Speaking from my own experience, one strug-
gles constantly with the scholarly disposition. On the one
hand, keeping such a stance is hard. Field research brings
emotional anguish and helplessness, and dealing with inert
bureaucracies and injustice brings fury and despair. More
importantly, it becomes difficult to separate advocacy from
critical thought; sensational images and banal policy-
speak too easily substitute for facts. On the other hand, it
is also a struggle to escape the scholar’s disposition. You
catch yourself speaking of genocide or child abduction as
variables and forgetting they are atrocities. More seriously,
you become stuck in arcane details and arguments, and in
fighting myths and sensation you can find yourself more
callous and petty than objective and insightful. Neither
circumstance does the victims, policy, or science the ser-
vice each deserves.
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This struggle—to get beyond sensation to facts, and to
find the balance between passion and dispassion—is appar-
ent in all three books. Each transcends. Two of the books,
R. Charli Carpenter’s Forgetting Children Born of War and
Scott Gates and Simon Reich’s anthology Child Soldiers in
the Age of Fractured States, push social scientists into a
realm mostly populated by activists and practitioners. Car-
penter looks at the politics of victimhood and aid: who
gets money and attention and who does not. She puzzles
why one group in particular—children born of wartime
rape in Bosnia—received enormous media attention but
little formal advocacy or services. Dissatisfied with the
usual technocratic explanations, she tries to bare the mind-
sets, politics, and social forces that shape (and subvert)
seemingly benign humanitarian agendas.
Gates and Reich tackle the opposite challenge: how to
bring more rigorous research into an advocacy movement
overwhelmed with its own success—eradicating child sol-
diers. The assembled essays reexamine the causes, con-
duct, and consequences of child soldiering, and ask what
we learn that might help end the practice. As in any edited
volume, we hear a cacophony of voices and views. Never-
theless, scholars of warfare will find in here vital lessons
for what is a major frontier in the field: rebel strategy,
organization, operations, and governance.
The third book, They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like
Children, by Romeo Dallaire, pushes a soldier and advo-
cate into the realm of the academic. Dallaire is a retired
Lieutenant-General from the Canadian Armed Forces, and
now sits in the Canadian Senate, but is best known for his
role as Commander of the United Nations (UN) peace-
keeping force during the Rwandan genocide. His rebirth
as an advocate for ending child soldiering pushed him
into a research collaboration with the political science
department at Dalhousie University. His book is a mass-
market effort at distilling lessons and pushing a policy
agenda. For a profession so concerned with explaining
order and violence, we hear awfully little from the men
and women in charge of keeping the peace. As with the
contributions to the Gates and Reich volume, social sci-
ence mixes with some of the myths and hyperbole sur-
rounding children in war, but Dallaire still offers scholars
astute insights on armed groups and the future of warfare.
A Primer on Children in War
The plight of children in war is appalling. Their schools
and homes are destroyed, or their parents killed. They
may be the last to receive scarce food or medicine. They
are killed in crossfire, attacks, and (more recently) by drones.
Women and girls are sexually assaulted and, as if that is
not horror enough, they and the children born of these
rapes could be traumatized or stigmatized for life.
The most visible child in war, however, is undoubtedly
the child soldier. We are all familiar with the image: a young
boy, invariably black or brown, carrying an AK-47 and slung
with bandoliers. No news article or book on the subject is
complete without this iconic image. Child soldiers have cap-
tured special media and Hollywood attention. In 2006 the
release of a feature film, Blood Diamond, as well as a docu-
mentary, Invisible Children, spawned an American move-
ment of tens of thousands of concerned students, lobbying
for Congressional action against child recruitment in
Uganda. By 2007 you could buy the memoirs of a boy sol-
dier with your Starbucks coffee. Subsequent years saw a
comic book series launched, several popular novels, and
innumerable documentaries, including an Academy Award
nominee, War Dance. In 2011, the film Machine Gun
Preacher told the true(ish) story of an American ex-gang
member rescuing child recruits from armed groups in South
Sudan. Finally, in 2012, Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 cam-
paign became the most viral video in the history of the Inter-
net. I cannot think of another “child protection” issue that
comes close to the same media attention.
Fortunately, more than simply a success as an American
pop icon, the campaign against child soldiering has been a
diplomatic and advocacy success as well. A relatively obscure
issue in the early 1990s, it entered the UN Security
Council’s focus in the mid-1990s, and a decade later nearly
every state in the world had agreed not to recruit (or at
least use in combat) children under eighteen, and cer-
tainly not under fifteen.1 The International Criminal Court
(ICC) treats the use of child soldiers under 15 as a war
crime, and it is the main charge against Thomas Lubanga,
the former rebel leader in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, in the ICC’s first case. It is also a central charge in
the Special Court of Sierra Leone’s pursuit of Liberian
ex-President Charles Taylor. A special UN representative
for children and armed conflict was created in 1997, and
has been highly influential in ending state recruitment
through negotiation and, where necessary, naming and
shaming. For the most part, child soldiering is now solely
the province of non-state armed groups, and even here the
UN special representative has begun to engage many forces
in discussion.2
Without question, child soldiering persists. No one has
an accurate count. Numbers like 200,000 or 300,000 have
been tossed about since the 1990s, based mainly on guess-
work, with obscure origins. These figures soon achieved
the status of fact, and the number persists in newspapers
and advocacy literature. Probably the number of children
in armed groups has gone down in the last 10 years, if
only because of the steep decline in the number and inten-
sity of wars, especially the decline or defeat of the forces
most notorious for their use, such as the Lord’s Resistance
Army in Uganda, or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.3 No
one knows. But armed groups in 21 countries still recruited
children the last time a systematic count was made, between
2004 and 2007.4 In the past year, there are signs that
children continue to be recruited in a familiar list of frag-
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Sudan, Darfur, and Somalia.5 New conflicts in 2011 also
brought worrying reports of new child recruitment, includ-
ing Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.
Why did the norm against child soldiering rise so sud-
denly and, by some measures, successfully? There seems to
be something deeply salient about the idea of the child
recruit. Few issues invoke more horror or fascination. This
salience undoubtedly helped launch the issue onto the
global stage. Yet other sensational, evil acts abound—like
children born of genocidal rape—and yet (as Carpenter
argues) these issues have not received the same attention
from international organizations. Why is that? What does
this tell us about the state of international advocacy and
the politics of policy-making?
This is the question posed by Charli Carpenter. Before
tackling it, however, it’s worth engaging the two volumes
on child soldiers. With iconic status have come iconic
images and ideas. Perhaps the most common image is that
of the traumatized youth returned from battle, or the girl
stigmatized and scorned for her rape by rebels. “They are
walking ghosts,” mourned a 2006 New York Times edito-
rial, “damaged, uneducated pariahs.” While mourning this
human tragedy, policymakers also fear that former child
fighters pose a risk to security. In 2007, the French foreign
minister warned that child soldiers are “a time bomb that
threatens stability and growth in Africa and beyond.” They
are “lost children,” he argued, “lost for peace and lost for
the development of their countries” (“Child Soldiers ‘are a
time bomb.’” BBC News, February 5, 2007).
Finally, the child soldier is seen as emblematic of the new
barbaric nature of war, and the depraved greed or madness
that leads armed leaders to recruit the most innocent. The
idea of this “new kind of war”—senseless, purposeless, crim-
inal, and barbaric—was firmly planted by eminent journal-
ists like Robert Kaplan and Jeffrey Gettleman and bolstered
by civil war scholars like Mary Kaldor and Carolyn Nord-
strom.6 The journalists were especially influenced by their
exposure to wars with heavy numbers of child recruits, from
Liberia to northern Uganda. These West and East African
wars, and the issue of child soldiering (along with wartime
rape andcivilianabuse), have shapedour conceptionofmod-
ern civil war to an amazing and unappreciated degree.
What is troubling is that we have very little evidence
that any of these iconic ideas and conventional wisdoms
are true. As we will see, the evidence is growing that they
are exaggerated or even misleading, not only distorting
policy, but hindering our larger understanding of who
recruits, who rebels, and why.
The Conference of Scholars: The
Gates and Reich Volume
I have made out the crusade against child soldiering to be
a success. Gates and Reich are less sanguine. Indeed, they
motivate their volume on the meager effect of public pres-
sure on non-state recruitment of children. Compared to
other advocacy movements, they argue, child soldiering
has enjoyed few tangible results.7 Not all the contributors
share this view. Chapter 3, by Tonderai Chikuhwa, empha-
sizes the rapid pace of progress, especially by UN Security
Council standards.8 Whether the pace of change has been
fast or slow is partly subjective. Compared to the cam-
paign against human trafficking, child soldiering has cer-
tainly been less successful at eradication.9 And they are
right to decry the slow and so far unproductive attempt to
prosecute offenders, an issue I’ll return to later.
The editors’ disappointment may also reflect the tim-
ing of the discussion that led to the book—a set of con-
ferences in 2006—and the fact that most of the cases and
data come from years before (or during) the unprec-
edented decline of civil wars in the years 1999 to 2005—a
trend not fully appreciated until some years afterwards.10
Not only have civil wars become fewer and smaller, but
the UN’s special representative for children and armed
conflict has recorded many more successes in engaging
non-state groups in dialogue since 2006 than before, when
the office focused mainly on government forces.11 One of
the troubles with so much policy-relevant research (and
here I am as much an offender as any) is the long lag to
publication, a problem augmented by the speed of the
academic press. This may be one reason why myths persist.
Nonetheless, Gates and Reich are right: non-state armed
groups and a few rogue regimes persist in child recruit-
ment. To understand why, they bring together a large group
of contributors who deliver a number of high-quality case
studies of groups, histories of children in war, some rare
survey data, and scrutiny of failed and successful policies.
Like many edited volumes, at first glance the chapters
resemble a motley collection of well-crafted but disjointed
parts. P.W. Singer, for instance, explains the rise of child
soldiering in the late twentieth century by the expansion
of light arms, disrupted economies, and the deterioration
of social norms against child enlistment.12 Two chapters
(one by Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich looking cross-
nationally, and one by Sarah Kenyon Lischer looking at
the Democratic Republic of the Congo) argue that refu-
gee and displacement camps, with their meager military
protection and horrible living standards, are prime recruit-
ing grounds for both forced and voluntary recruitment.
Country case studies by James B. Pugel (on Liberia), Jo
Becker (Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal), and Francisco
Gutiérrez Sanín (Colombia) illustrate how the ease of child
indoctrination is central to recruitment.
The parts are not so much disjointed, however, as sim-
ply reflecting diverse and sometimes conflicting views.
Moreover, the book contains foundations for a larger, more
coherent structure—possibly even a unifying theory. This
comes in chapter 5 by Jens Christopher Andvig and Scott
Gates, who frame the recruitment question and policy
solutions in plain labor supply and demand. Their goal is
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One gets the sense that Andvig and Gates bring in the
language of labor economics reluctantly, perhaps for fear
of confusing a non-technical audience (and, I gather,
because the approach met with open hostility and rage).
But I think the model is a hugely important one, one that
illuminates rebel recruitment more generally, and deserves
to be outlined more explicitly.
In standard labor economics, the quantity of labor
demanded by firms is an array of different quantities desired
at different prices. The demand function arises from the
value firms place on the work performed—the marginal
product of labor. This labor demand is often depicted in a
two-by-two graph with price on the vertical axis and quan-
tity on the horizontal. The labor demand curve slopes
downwards, as more labor is demanded at lower prices.
Meanwhile, the standard labor supply curve is a function
of the reservation wage (the intercept) and the slope and
curvature is driven by the relation between the responsive-
ness (elasticity) of laborers to wages. It is an aggregation of
individual decisions over labor versus leisure. It could be
upward sloping, as is conventional, or it could be flat, as
in the famous W. Arthur Lewis model of “unlimited labor”
in developing countries.13
On the face of it, it might seem callous, absurd, or
simply inappropriate to think of acts like child punish-
ment and abduction in terms of this model of free labor.
But let us hold that thought momentarily, and see where
the model takes us.
Imagine a segmented labor market, with two labor
demand functions: one for children and one for adults,
driven by their different marginal productivities. What
happens with the introduction of cheap and light weap-
onry? Both adults and children become more productive,
but children disproportionately so, for they could not han-
dle previous weapons. The demand curve steepens and
shifts to the right, increasing the quantity of children
demanded relative to adults. If (as some assume) the labor
supply of children is flatter than that of adults, because
they are plentiful, or because war destroys their educa-
tional opportunities and basic food or shelter, that quan-
tity demanded could rise dramatically.
Alternatively, consider the effect of a group with a strong
religious, ethnic, or other ideological appeal, or set of skills
in indoctrination and information control. To the extent
they can use these skills and messages to elicit higher com-
mitment and performance, labor demand steepens and
shifts out again—more so for children if they are indeed
more susceptible to indoctrination. Meanwhile, to the
extent that ideology provides non-pecuniary benefits to
recruits, like self or group esteem, the reservation wage
will fall and the labor supply will become more elastic—
again disproportionately among children.
This framing is helpful because, one by one, the varied
explanations for child soldiers fall into place in this simple
framework. In some sense, it provides a unifying frame-
work. It also helps avoid confusing statements (seen else-
where in the volume) that children are attractive recruits
because they “come on the cheap.”14 For the “price” of
children is not a given condition of the environment but
rather an equilibrium outcome of supply and demand,
and the forces beneath. As I’ve argued in a paper with
Bernd Beber, children will not always and everywhere be
inexpensive.15
The model is further helpful as a guide to predict where
and when child soldiering will occur, based on available
technologies and modes of rebellion (which drive child
versus adult productivity) or labor conditions. It also helps
explain seemingly barbaric tactics, like massacres and dis-
placement (which reduce the returns to non-rebellious
labor) or forcing recruits to commit acts of violence (which
lower reservation wages, out of fear that they can never
return home). Thus, the barbaric act suddenly reveals itself
as cruelly calculating. This reframing is important. If child
recruiters are mad men, our options are few. But if they
are self-interested and calculating leaders simply respond-
ing to incentives and constraints, suddenly a world of
policy and counter-insurgency options is exposed.
Indeed, this simple model suddenly tells us how we can
think about many of the policy prescriptions throughout
the book. Armed protection of children (as argued in chap-
ter 4 by Achvarina and Reich) or “child friendly spaces”
(as advocated in chapter 13 by Maureen W. McClure and
Gonzalo Retamal) shift the supply curve to the left, and
the availability of schools, jobs, or simply food and shelter
steepen the supply curve dramatically. Punishment of lead-
ers in international courts, or by concerned citizens, diaspo-
ras, or donors who withhold their material support from
abusive groups lower the child’s marginal product of labor
relative to adults.
My only lament is that a model like this one was not
used as an organizing framework for the whole volume.
To do so, however, would likely have alienated or enraged
the policy audience and participants, as even that sole
chapter created discord in the group.16 The policy-
relevant researcher must keep watch on all sides.
Nevertheless, political science is on the cusp of a more
structured and formal understanding of the “industrial
organization of rebellion.” For two decades our under-
standing of armed groups and violent participation has
advanced mainly when scholars integrate deep case and
qualitative knowledge with insights from agency theory.
Mark Lichbach promoted the idea of the rational peas-
ant who required selective incentives to solve the collec-
tive action problem inherent in popular revolt. Elisabeth
Wood illustrated that selective incentives need not be
material, and that ideology and injustice can strongly moti-
vate participation. Scott Gates noted that the leader’s
challenge in rebellion is not merely motivating participa-
tion (the collective action problem) but also motivating
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principal-agent logic with imperfect information. Jeremy
Weinstein’s study of Ugandan and Peruvian armed groups
illustrated the impact that the consequent moral hazard
and adverse selection play in determining recruitment and
control strategies, and the impact on civilian abuse and
other insurgent behavior. Bernd Beber and I extend this
principal-agent approach to understand coercion and child
recruitment, and why the two go hand in hand.17
These increasingly theoretical and formal analyses have
been valuable precisely because they have provided coher-
ent and testable explanations for seemingly puzzling rebel
behavior. Weinstein, for instance, shows how abundant
material resources and weak ideological appeal or social
bases of support lead to an adverse selection problem in
recruitment, and with it an opportunistic and violent
army with few incentives for restraint against civilians.
Gates’ earlier work in 2002 brings in the contest element
of civil war and illustrates how this information problem
is amplified by geography.18 Formalizing the logic in
models, moreover, has not made these theories more mate-
rial. Indeed, if anything, they have strengthened the
case that non-pecuniary incentives—injustice, ideology
or indoctrination—matter most of all.
Each of these theories have studied the microeconomic
decision to recruit or rebel. The Gates and Andvig chapter
complements these with a broader, macroeconomic labor
market view. Even though it is targeted at the narrower
question of child soldiering, it is the first application of
conventional labor economics I’ve seen in rebellion, and
represents an important frontier. I sincerely hope this chap-
ter is a prelude to a more ambitious, formal paper or book
on rebel labor markets in general. We could learn a great
deal about rebellion by beginning to unpack and system-
atize what drives labor demand in a rebel group, how the
equilibrium changes in wars of short versus long duration,
what happens in segmented rebellions and regular eco-
nomic markets, or when governments and rebels compete
for the same pool of recruits. In this sense, the chapter
represents not just a unifying framework, but an impor-
tant advance.
There is a second important advance in this volume.
The case studies in chapter 7 by Jo Becker (on Burma,
Sri Lanka, and Nepal), and in chapter 8 by Francisco
Gutiérrez Sanin (on Colombia) carefully show how cen-
tral are ideology and indoctrination to armed recruit-
ment in general, and child soldiering in particular. The
mainstream political science literature on who rebels and
why has been nearly silent on the methods of indoctri-
nation and the manufacture of ideology. Becker and
Gutiérrez show the careful experimentation, successes,
and failures of groups struggling to retain and motivate
recruits. Children, their observation suggests, are more
susceptible to this indoctrination.19
As it happens, my own data on child soldiers in north-
ern Uganda support the same conclusion: the younger the
recruits were forcibly recruited, the more likely they even-
tually expressed loyalty to the group, and the longer they
stayed before attempting escape.20 Indeed, the ease of child
indoctrination could be a necessary condition for their
recruitment, for a 14-year-old eats food and uses weapons
and could claim market wages nearly as expensive as that
of a 19-year-old, but is inferior at a majority of military
tasks. It is their responsiveness to indoctrination and coer-
cion as an incentive that increases their marginal produc-
tivity and, with it, labor demand.
The Soldier Turned Scholar: Dallaire
on Child Soldiers
Romeo Dallaire approaches the issue of child soldiering
uniquely, from the perspective of one who encountered
them at the point of his gun, or he at the point of theirs.
What is most useful about his book is the military per-
spective so often absent from the academy and from advo-
cates. Child soldiers must be treated as human beings, but
we would do well to remember that from the perspective
of armed leaders they are also a “weapons platform” that
are attractive because they are low technology, cheap,
expendable, and plentiful.21 Dallaire’s candor is refresh-
ing. Like some of the contributions in the Gates and Reich
volume, however, such statements confuse the forces that
influence labor supply, demand, and equilibrium choices.
One could argue that supply and demand curves and
principal-agent theory dehumanize and overcomplicate. I
argue that incentives matter, and we avoid their system-
atic analysis to our peril. But the absence of any overarch-
ing structure (a feature not just of these books, but the
genre) means it is hard to hold the many competing theo-
ries in your head, weigh which are likely to be more impor-
tant, and act accordingly. Seemingly arcane ideas like
“elasticity” matter because, by definition, they tell us the
sensitivity of the whole system to each moving part—
surely a key ingredient in deciding what to do.
Like the Becker and Gutiérrez chapters mentioned ear-
lier, Dallaire adds to the evidence that indoctrination and
ideology are crucial to successful recruitment and reten-
tion. He does so in two revealing ways, one intentional,
one not. The first draws on his own boyhood experiences
in cadet camp, where (by his own account) they merely
played at being soldiers.22 He draws a stark contrast between
his boyhood training and the unfortunate children put on
the front lines of civil war “under the gun of inhuman
adults.”23 Certainly there is a huge difference between
Canadian cadet camp and an army of drugged and wild
children fighting on front lines. But it would be a mistake
to forget that many of the most active child recruiters of
the past two decades have been disciplined in rather con-
ventional military forces. Also, cadet camps, even Cana-
dian ones, are first and foremost institutions aimed at
training, recruiting and, inescapably, indoctrinating chil-
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to influence and the manipulation of adults. Indeed, it
was as an adolescent he claims to have found his lifelong
vocation as a soldier.24
The second and more intentional illustration is his com-
parison of children across different Rwandan forces. He
starts with the relatively disciplined and professional Rwan-
dan Patriotic Front (RPF), an ethnically Tutsi-led group
that invaded an ethnically Hutu-led Rwanda in 1990. As
Dallaire experienced firsthand, the RPF front lines were
manned by indoctrinated and relatively well-trained ado-
lescents. He contrasts their regimented order with the
approach taken by the Hutu extremists, who whipped
disenfranchised adults and adolescents into an ideological
frenzy, armed with machetes and trained to be “mon-
strous killing and mutilating machines.”25 The third com-
parison is with late joiners to the RPF—youth who were
“cocky, gun happy and arrogant” and a threat to all in the
fragile peace that descended post-war and post-genocide.26
These latecomer RPF recruits looked more like the unreg-
imented Hutu extremists, and largely suited the evolving
purpose of the rebel force.
The most important lesson I took from these examples
is that the frenzy, the coercion, the training, the desensi-
tization, and ultimately the genocidal acts were not irratio-
nal or inhuman, but sadly all too rational and (if history is
any guide) all too human. There was method in the mad-
ness. I was surprised, therefore, that Dallaire struck a dif-
ferent tone elsewhere in the book, seeming to blame child
soldiering on madness rather than method, as what hap-
pens “when states fail, when leaders go mad, when the
chaos of violence takes over souls.”27 He shows sympathy
for the view that such armed groups have no ideology, no
clear goals.28 What a contrast to his prime cases—the lead-
ers of the RPF and the Hutu militants—who, if anything,
were all too cool, ideological, and goal-oriented, to the
detriment of the civilians around them.
This “new barbarism” language is common throughout
the civil war literature.29 The idea of new, criminalized war
without meaning is influential in P.W. Singer’s chapter in
the Gates and Reich volume as well.30 But the sentiment
strikes me not only as misleading, but also harmful if we are
serious about ending war and human rights abuses.31
The emphasis on criminal and non-ideological move-
ments ignores the more reform-minded and ideological
rebels that took power in (for example) Ethiopia, Uganda
and Rwanda in the past two decades. It also ignores the
sophisticated belief systems—spiritual and ethnic—so suc-
cessfully used by groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army
in Uganda. Finally, it overlooks the parochial rebels who
formed to defend their own communities in places such
as Liberia and Sierra Leone. William Reno’s review of Afri-
can civil wars chronicles this diversity as well as any.32 To
be sure, many modern rebel groups have come to look
more like bandits than ideological warriors, but one must
consider the environment—as emphasized by Laia Bal-
cells and Stathis Kalyvas an international system that fos-
tered irregular warfare and, from the work of Jeffrey Herbst,
states with fixed international borders but uncontrolled
peripheries.33 Weak and dying rebel groups cannot be eas-
ily crushed by weak states, and these descend into banditry.
There is, no question, a dose of madness in many mod-
ern rebel leaders. But I am unconvinced this madness is
new. To treat child recruitment as barbaric, and their moti-
vations criminal or simple madness, is hazardous. It
obscures the important fact that insurgent leaders will
respond to incentives, including the threat of punishment.
Perhaps this talk of “barbarism” is more rhetoric than
real belief, for neither Dallaire nor the contributors to the
Gates and Reich volume bring the new barbarism into
their policy prescriptions. The recommendations are many,
but fall into a few main camps. One is quite obvious, but
sadly elusive: work to end warfare and, where you cannot,
provide military protection to civilians so that they can-
not be abducted, terrorized, or have such poor security
that it makes sense to pick up a gun.
There is also a near universal recognition of the need
for prosecution and punishment of those who recruit child
soldiers, and amnesty for the children themselves. Com-
mon sense and the formal theory converge here: the fear
of punishment should preclude the recruitment of child
soldiers in the future. Unfortunately, the ICC nearly bun-
gled its first case, against Congolese warlord Thomas
Lubanga for child soldiering, and he was nearly acquitted
over faulty procedure (“Times Topics: Thomas Lubanga.”
In New York Times, January 12, 2011). Domestic courts in
Africa have acquitted other child recruiters for lack of a
solid and well-executed case.34 The world is in danger of
establishing a custom of impunity, not punishment. This
failure is the root of Gates and Reich’s disappointment
with the movement against child soldiering.35
Given both books’ emphasis on indoctrination as a cen-
tral explanation for child recruitment, however, I am
puzzled by the general lack of attention given to counter-
indoctrination. In war zones where a child faces a one in
twenty chance of abduction in a given year, it is striking
how seldom radio stations and classrooms and commu-
nity meetings are dedicated to information on rebel false-
hoods and misconceptions, or training on escape. If we
can drill American children in school about what to do in
case of fire, why not in war zones prepare them against
indoctrination or abduction? In northern Uganda, I wit-
nessed such efforts emerge organically from civil society
and concerned parents rather than from the international
community or military.36 I wonder if part of our failure
has been to think in terms of long-term development, or
look to military solutions, rather than try to alter the fun-
damental naiveté and malleability of children that makes
them so attractive as recruits.
Finally, given that warfare is unlikely to disappear, and
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improve opportunities for children, and especially their
economic and educational opportuities. This proposal
makes sense in the framework of our labor markets model:
to reduce child recruitment, increase their reservation wage,
and lower the inelasticity of supply. This is a valuable goal.
I have two quibbles with it, however. First, relieving pov-
erty is a long-term solution and not what many, including
contributors McClure and Retamal, demand—rapid and
large-scale intervention when the need arises.37 Second,
child soldier scholars and advocates emphasize the need
for better reintegration services and targeting of child sol-
diers.38 This approach presumes that ex-combatants, espe-
cially children, are traumatized or outcast and require
special services, even at the risk of stigmatization. But a
growing body of rigorous research suggests that victims of
violence—child or adult, combatant or not—are socially
and psychologically resilient, and more often than not are
welcomed by their communities.39 They are poor and
uneducated, but not much more so than their non-
combatant peers.40 And victims of violence, even when
they are also perpetrators, may actually become more
engaged and productive citizens, rather than sources of
continuing violence.41
The evidence, while still fragmentary, makes a case for
broad-based assistance that targets the traumatized, the
poor, and the vulnerable rather than stigmatizing groups
like child soldiers. Likewise, we may want to pause before
pushing for advocacy and assistance for another stigma-
tized group: children born of wartime rape.
The Scholar as Advocate: Carpenter
and Children Born of War
Whether or not advocates ought to target stigmatized groups
with assistance, they certainly do in practice. Charli Car-
penter asks why some groups get that attention and not
others. Her answer has lessons for the politics of norm
change and advocacy—one of the most novel and vibrant
literatures in international relations of the past two decades.
Carpenter focuses on the case of Bosnia, where unknown
thousands of babies were born of wartime rape perpe-
trated by enemy soldiers. Crucial in Bosnia is that the rape
was not a byproduct of war but a strategic weapon—of
terror, humiliation, and genocide. It is a weapon employed
in other wars (though I see only Rwanda given as an exam-
ple).42 Carpenter gives many more instances, however, of
forced marriage and slavery, from Kuwait to Liberia, and
Congo to East Timor.43 Carpenter’s is an important ques-
tion and case, for the norms literature has mainly focused
on explaining successful norm diffusion. What about the
norms that fail to diffuse? Ignoring these cases is a serious
flaw in previous research designs.
Carpenter bases her work on four years of interviews
with rights advocates, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), journalists, social workers, and government offi-
cials, mainly in Bosnia but also in UN and NGO hubs
like New York and Geneva. Her focus, she explains, is on
the international policy response and not the children,
and so her data on the children themselves is secondary
and fragmentary, from case worker studies.44 She also draws
on a secondary literature from other war zones, including
that from northern Uganda.
How do international norms spread, and what is the
role of transnational advocacy networks? The standard
account, typified by scholars such as Martha Finnemore,
Kathryn Sikkink, and Margaret Keck, puts enormous
emphasis on “moral entrepreneurs”—individuals and advo-
cacy groups that push a particular agenda to a core group
of opinion leaders, aiming for a cascade of new norm
adoption and, eventually, internalization of the norm.45
Incentives and institutions matter, but the existence of the
pushy moral entrepreneur is essential. What Carpenter
shows is that moral entrepreneurs are not enough. Their
goals must mesh with the discourse and interests of states
and international organizations, or the message will not
stick. Human rights and humanitarian issues do not sim-
ply exist, she explains, they are constructed by these entre-
preneurs. If the construction doesn’t fit collective interests,
they will not be pursued. In this situation, the moral entre-
preneurs themselves may not even emerge in force.
Why do children born or wartime rape fit so poorly
with the interests of the international organizations in Bos-
nia? Reasons abound: the population is somewhat small,
they are hard to identify and collect data on, and their
problems are hard to solve;46 the Bosnian government is
decentralized, suspicious of Western imperialism, and
inattentive to gender;47 and the topic is politically sensi-
tive and morally complicated, such that diplomatic orga-
nizations like the UN can be averse to such issues.48 These
are technocratic excuses, for the most part, and Carpenter
grants them a role. But she is unsatisfied. Other equally
complicated issues get tackled all the time.
Carpenter wants to convince us that something more
inhibits action. The framing of the issue matters, as do
competing issues and narratives. To elevate the plight of
the child, she argues, would diminish two other powerful
symbols and narratives: the wrong committed against raped
women, and the wrong against the ethnic group targeted
for cleansing. Children, she suggests, are the embodiment
of any national identity. Forced impregnation by an enemy
is a symbol of aggression and humiliation. These children
are a symbol of past aggression, and can be a powerful tool
for rebuilding a postwar order and identity.49 Even if not
used consciously as a tool, the new society has an interest
in minimizing their profile or presence, if only because of
discomfort or ambivalence.50 All of these factors raise the
difficulty of organizing around the issue.51
This “competing interests” thesis is important, and
deserves to be considered in every case of norm diffusion
moving forward. It has parallels to recent studies of norm
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according to the fit between local and international norms
and institutions.52 But I hesitate to give it primary posi-
tion in the case of children born of war.
First, I am not convinced that the “competing narra-
tive” explanation is strictly necessary. The more banal
and technocratic explanations strike me as sufficient to
deter a UN agency or international organization from
intervention. Perhaps the issues faced by the children,
the small population, and the difficulty in counting and
reaching them, were enough to deter action. There are
innumerable vulnerable groups, and international orga-
nizations seem to have room for only so many causes
célèbres. Moreover, I think Carpenter downplays too much
a legitimate UN and NGO concern that targeting chil-
dren born of wartime rape would stigmatize, and possi-
bly hurt more than help. In my own experience, agencies
like UNICEF have (until recently) not been concerned
enough with stigmatization, and they have targeted child
soldiers and “AIDS orphans” with zeal in Liberia and
northern Uganda, where I have worked the most. But in
neither place was there great stigma associated with AIDS
or rebel abduction, when nearly every family unit has
been affected. It sounds as though the stigma concern is
much more acute in Bosnia. A more comparative study,
one that compared equally “complicated” issues and how
their construction matches or not the existing interests,
would provide a stronger test of Carpenter’s theory. I
hope to see it in future work.
Second, my experience working with former child sol-
diers and forced wives in Liberia and northern Uganda
has made me cautious of claims that particular groups
experience more acute abuse, neglect, and discrimination—
experiences Carpenter assigns to Bosnian children born
of rape.53 It seems there are no data, and certainly no
systematic data, on children born of wartime rape in
Bosnia. Yet the limited rigorous data we have on war-
affected youth suggest that stigma is lower than feared,
and poverty, while extreme, is comparable to that of their
non-combatant peers (at least in a handful of African
cases). This was the outcome I observed in communities
in northern Uganda, who deliberately embraced rather
than excluded their stolen children, including children
forcibly born. Some returning women and children are
ostracized, but systematic data revealed (somewhat
unexpectedly) they are the exception rather than the rule.54
This pattern of resilience and integration has been observed
in other regions, including West Africa.55 Policymakers’
worst fears were not realized, and in some cases the oppo-
site appears to be true.
This underlines the importance of systematic and rep-
resentative data, including data on the counterfactual, for
good advocacy and good policy. James Pugel’s analysis of
Liberian ex-combatant survey data in the Gates and Reich
book exemplifies what is possible.56 With little time, lim-
ited funds, and the help of a UN agency, he fielded a rapid
survey of demobilizing combatants, modeled after Mac-
artan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein’s pioneering sur-
vey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone.57 There should be
more efforts like Pugel’s.
Collecting such data will take unusual precaution and
care, however, especially when dealing with stigmatized pop-
ulations like those in Bosnia. Representative, population-
based surveys that screen and then target sensitive
subpopulations probably offer the best prospect of infor-
mation on stigmatized population, an approach that worked
well for my collaborator Jeannie Annan and me in our search
fordataonchild soldiers and forcedwives inUganda.58 Barry
Ames’ methodological chapter in the Gates and Reich book
has important lessons for data collection in war, and not
just on children.59 I hope Carpenter’s book spurs this impor-
tant next step.
Social Science and Social Change
Many of us—including nearly all the authors mentioned
in this essay—enter academia with a passion for social
change. You quickly learn, however, not to advertise these
motives. Policy relevance helps frame a paper, but cannot
be the main basis of a serious journal. Carpenter tells a
story in her Preface that, to me, sounds familiar. On the
academic job circuit, she writes, “I blurted out once that
year, in a conversation that probably lost me a job offer,
that my next book might be about children of war. A
famous political scientist coolly asked me why was this
theoretically significant. It took years for a persuasive answer
to that question to materialize.”60
I used to resent this insistence on theoretical signifi-
cance and politics as the end in itself. Why can’t we
respectably apply social science methods to explain pol-
icy? What I’ve come to realize is that the “why is this
theoretically significant?” question is not an obstacle I
must overcome to gain academic esteem and publish in
top journals, but rather is fundamental to that goal of
social change. This is a point young scholars, especially
Ph.D. students, ought to hear more often (I wish some-
one had told me). The big questions and theory are impor-
tant precisely because they tell us something fundamental
about how politics and political beings work. This is
what gives a study generalizability, and with that the
power for much broader change.
Let me conclude with two examples from my own work,
not to trumpet my successes, but rather to illustrate my
failures and regrets (for I would hesitate to illustrate any-
one else’s mistakes so frankly). By 2008, my work on chil-
dren impacted by war spurred an interest in post-war
recovery and stabilization. How to raise employment and
incomes after war, I began to ask, and would poverty reduc-
tion reduce the risk of social instability? Like many, I caught
the randomized control trial bug. I launched evaluations
of a post-conflict cash transfer program in northern
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rural Liberia.61 In both cases, preliminary results suggest
that the programs decreased poverty and reduced male
aggression and, in the Liberia case, lowered the chances of
recruitment into neighboring countries’ conflicts.
These are important findings, you might think. But
what have we learned about poverty and violence? The
answer is unclear. Each program suggested a hodgepodge
of activities (like training, physical capital, and some form
of committed investment). This makes it hard to identify
the constraints people faced and to test alternative theo-
ries of poverty—surely the most important thing I could
have learned. As for violence, why are these men less aggres-
sive? Because the treatment increases their opportunity
cost of violence? Lessens their stress? Further removes them
from mobilization networks? Or mitigates feelings of depri-
vation and injustice? These are the fundamental theoreti-
cal questions we must answer. They also happen to be the
answers most important to better policy and programs.
The research design, however, makes them difficult to
answer.
As it happens, it’s possible to answer these questions in
part, and to weigh in on central theoretical debates on
poverty and violence—or so I am attempting. And my
more recent projects avoid the same mistakes. If only, I
sometimes wish, a famous scholar coolly asked me in 2008
why my work was theoretically significant. It is now 2012,
and we do ourselves, our students, and public policy a
favor by asking that precise question.
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